To invest or screen efficiently: a potential conflict in relationships governed by incomplete contracts
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- Bac, Mehmet, 2000. "On-the-Job Specific Training and Efficient Screening," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(4), pages 681-701, October.
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