Overinvestment in General Capital Provokes Underinvestment in Specific Capital
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Volume (Year): 49 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1987.
"Optimal Contracts with Lock-In,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt19f324hf, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Dow, Gregory K., 1985. "Internal bargaining and strategic innovation in the theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 301-320, September.
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