Overinvestment in General Capital Provokes Underinvestment in Specific Capital
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Volume (Year): 49 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1989.
"Optimal Contracts with Lock-In,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 51-68, March.
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1987. "Optimal Contracts with Lock-In," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt19f324hf, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1987. "Optimal Contracts with Lock-In," Economics Working Papers 8758, University of California at Berkeley.
- Dow, Gregory K., 1985. "Internal bargaining and strategic innovation in the theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 301-320, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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