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Relationships Between Politicians and Voters Through Elections: A Review Essay

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  • Juan Carlos Berganza

Abstract

This paper surveys the literature on the most fundamental institution in a democracy: the appointment of the policymakers through democratic elections. Elections perform at least three different functions: (i) to discipline the elected officials by the threat of not being reappointed; (ii) to select competent individuals for public office; and (iii) to aggregate and represent the voters' conflicting preferences. We also review the literature on political business cycles. The essay is not meant to be just a review of what has been done in the past, although that is part of the motivation and development. Rather, it is meant to describe a series of productive and useful lines of research, lines that are likely to expand our understanding of the underlying political and economic behavior.

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  • Juan Carlos Berganza, 1998. "Relationships Between Politicians and Voters Through Elections: A Review Essay," Working Papers wp1998_9809, CEMFI.
  • Handle: RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp1998_9809
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    Cited by:

    1. Jula, Dorin, 2008. "Economic Impact of Political Cycles – The Relevance of European experinces for Romania," Working Papers of Institute for Economic Forecasting 081101, Institute for Economic Forecasting.

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