IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/cemfdt/9902.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Is It Welfare Improving to Insulate Monetary Policy from the Political Arena?

Author

Listed:
  • Berganza, J.C.

Abstract

This paper presents a two-party model in which partisan and opportunistic politicians have two options: (i) to reach an agreement with respect to the central banker before elections are held, which leads to elections becoming a toss up, or (ii) to let the citizens vote for their proposed central bankers, which endogenizes the probabilities of being elected. Parties want to appoint their ideal central bankers (partisan), they care about winning the elections (opportunistic), and they are risk-averse about the electoral results. The paper shows that, under some circunstances, both parties may be interested in leaving the appointment of the central banker out of the electoral contest.

Suggested Citation

  • Berganza, J.C., 1999. "Is It Welfare Improving to Insulate Monetary Policy from the Political Arena?," Papers 9902, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:cemfdt:9902
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Juan Carlos Berganza, 1998. "Relationships Between Politicians and Voters Through Elections: A Review Essay," Working Papers wp1998_9809, CEMFI.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CENTRAL BANKS ; PUBLIC POLICY ; MONETARY POLICY ; GAME THEORY;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:cemfdt:9902. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cemfies.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.