Is It Welfare Improving to Insulate Monetary Policy from the Political Arena?
This paper presents a two-party model in which partisan and opportunistic politicians have two options: (i) to reach an agreement with respect to the central banker before elections are held, which leads to elections becoming a toss up, or (ii) to let the citizens vote for their proposed central bankers, which endogenizes the probabilities of being elected. Parties want to appoint their ideal central bankers (partisan), they care about winning the elections (opportunistic), and they are risk-averse about the electoral results. The paper shows that, under some circunstances, both parties may be interested in leaving the appointment of the central banker out of the electoral contest.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros. Casado del Alisal, 5-28014 Madrid, Spain.|
Web page: http://www.cemfi.es/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:cemfdt:9902. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.