Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
The authors introduce a new solution concept, divine equilibrium, which refines the set of sequential equilibria in signaling games by requiring that off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy an additional restriction. This restriction rules out implausible sequential equilibria in examples. Divine equilibria exist because a sequential equilibrium that fails to be divine cannot be in a stable component. The authors demonstrate through examples that the stable component of signaling games is typically smaller than the set of divine equilibria and present a characterization of the set of stable outcomes in generic signaling games. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.
Volume (Year): 55 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 1 212 998 3820|
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: https://www.econometricsociety.org/publications/econometrica/access/ordering-back-issues Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:3:p:647-61. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.