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Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information

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  • John Duggan

    (University of Rochester)

Abstract

An infinite sequence of elections with no term limits is modelled. In each period a challenger with privately known preferences is randomly drawn from the electorate to run against the incumbent, and the winner chooses a policy outcome in a one‐dimensional issue space. One theorem is that there exists an equilibrium in which the median voter is decisive: an incumbent wins re‐election if and only if his most recent policy choice gives the median voter a payoff at least as high as he would expect from a challenger. The equilibrium is symmetric, stationary, and the behavior of voters is consistent with both retrospective and prospective voting. A second theorem is that, in fact, it is the only equilibrium possessing the latter four conditions — decisiveness of the median voter is implied by them.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • John Duggan, "undated". "Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information," Wallis Working Papers WP9, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    • Handle: RePEc:roc:wallis:wp9
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