The Equilibrium Level of Rigidity in a Hierarchy
A hierarchy is considered in which those agents who perform better advance to higher levels When agents are heterogeneous and endowed with simple behavioral rules Harrington (1998a) showed that agents at high levels tend to be rigid in the sense that their behavior is unresponsive to their environment relative to agents at low levels In the current paper agents are homogeneous but sophisticated as their behavior is required to be consistent with a subgame perfect equilibrium Agents at high levels are found instead to be flexible relative to agents at low levels
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rosen, Sherwin, 1986.
"Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
- Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1998. "The Social Selection of Flexible and Rigid Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 63-82, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)