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Partially Informative Signaling

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  • Stamland, Tommy

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  • Stamland, Tommy, 1999. "Partially Informative Signaling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 148-161, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:89:y:1999:i:1:p:148-161
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Riley, John G., 1975. "Competitive signalling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 174-186, April.
    3. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    4. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April.
    5. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Callander, Steven & Wilkie, Simon, 2007. "Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 262-286, August.
    2. Shogren, Jason F. & Stamland, Tommy, 2006. "Consistent estimation of the value of statistical life," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 262-281, August.
    3. Hedlund, Jonas, 2024. "Signaling through Bayesian persuasion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 15-27.
    4. Jason F. Shogren & Tommy Stamland, 2005. "Self-Protection and Value of Statistical Life Estimation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(1).

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