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Job Market Signalling, Stereotype Threat, and Counter-Stereotypical Behavior

  • Richard Chisik

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada)

ABSTRACT: We introduce stereotype threat in a multiple-productivity signalling model. Existence of multiple self-fulfilling stereotypes, which can generate statistical discrimination, is more likely if there is less variance in the ability distribution. A low endogenously-correct stereotype about a group forces higher-ability group members to choose a higher-productivity and a higher separating signal, thereby engaging in counter-stereotypical behaviour. This counter-stereotypical behaviour causes the remaining partially-pooling group to have lower average productivity, reinforcing the negative stereotype. The co-existence of stereotype threat and counter-stereotypical behaviour can explain the simultaneity of lower wages and higher education attainment in a group facing labour-market discrimination.

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Paper provided by Ryerson University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 024.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2010
Date of revision: Oct 2013
Handle: RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp024
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