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Dynamic signaling and market breakdown

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  • Kremer, Ilan
  • Skrzypacz, Andrzej

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  • Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2007. "Dynamic signaling and market breakdown," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 58-82, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:133:y:2007:i:1:p:58-82
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    2. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    3. Korajczyk, Robert A. & Lucas, Deborah J. & McDonald, Robert L., 1992. "Equity Issues with Time-Varying Asymmetric Information," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(03), pages 397-417, September.
    4. Georg Noldeke & Eric van Damme, 1990. "Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 1-23.
    5. Nick Feltovich & Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, 2002. "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 630-649, Winter.
    6. Korajczyk, Robert A & Lucas, Deborah J & McDonald, Robert L, 1991. "The Effect of Information Releases on the Pricing and Timing of Equity Issues," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(4), pages 685-708.
    7. Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1999. "Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(4), pages 949-970.
    8. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    9. Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 420-442, June.
    10. Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 345-364.
    11. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
    12. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    13. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    14. Teoh, Siew Hong & Hwang, Chuan Yang, 1991. "Nondisclosure and Adverse Disclosure as Signals of Firm Value," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 283-313.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vladimir Asriyan & William Fuchs & Brett Green, 2017. "Information aggregation in dynamic markets with adverse selection," Economics Working Papers 1573, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2017.
    2. Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2012. "Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1433-1504, July.
    3. Adelino, Manuel & Gerardi, Kristopher S. & Hartman-Glaser, Barney, 2016. "Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, revised 01 Mar 2018.
    4. Francesc Dilmé & Fei Li, 2016. "Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 57-82, February.
    5. Vladimir Asriyan, 2017. "Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Adverse Selection," 2017 Meeting Papers 988, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Francesc Dilme & Fei Li, 2012. "Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Fuchs, William & Öry, Aniko & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2016. "Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
    8. Jun, Byoung Heon & Park, In-Uck, 2010. "Anti-Limit Pricing," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 51(2), pages 1-22, December.
    9. Fuchs, William & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2015. "Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 371-406.
    10. Kaya, Ayça, 2009. "Repeated signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 841-854, July.
    11. Francesc Dilmé, 2012. "Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-063, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 03 Oct 2013.
    12. Dilmé, Francesc, 2017. "Noisy signaling in discrete time," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 13-25.
    13. Philip Bond & Yaron Leitner, 2013. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Working Papers 13-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, revised 04 Feb 2014.
    14. Francesc Dilme & Fei Li:, 2012. "Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-048, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 03 Sep 2013.
    15. Francesc Dilme & Fei Li, 2013. "Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout Risk, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 24 Apr 2014.
    16. Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2009. "Reputation and Repeated Bargaining with a Third Party," 2009 Meeting Papers 151, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Francesc Dilmé, 2012. "Dynamic Quality Signaling with Moral Hazard," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    18. Philip Bond & Yaron Leitner, 2012. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Working Papers 12-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    19. Bond, Philip & Leitner, Yaron, 2015. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 155-167.
    20. Francesc Dilmé, 2014. "Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    21. Bond, Philip & Zhong, Hongda, 2016. "Buying high and selling low: stock repurchases and persistent asymmetric information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67011, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    22. Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2008. "The Dynamics of Bargaining Postures: The Role of a Third Party," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    23. Daley, Brendan & Green, Brett, 2014. "Market signaling with grades," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 114-145.
    24. Reyer Gerlagh & Matti Liski, 2014. "Cake-Eating with Private Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 5050, CESifo Group Munich.

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