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Tariff policy for a monopolist in a signaling game

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  • Kolev, Dobrin R.
  • Prusa, Thomas J.

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  • Kolev, Dobrin R. & Prusa, Thomas J., 1999. "Tariff policy for a monopolist in a signaling game," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 51-76, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:49:y:1999:i:1:p:51-76
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Feenstra, Robert C., 1995. "Estimating the effects of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics,in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 30, pages 1553-1595 Elsevier.
    2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August.
    3. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    4. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    5. Bagwell, K. & Staiger, R.W., 1996. "Reciprocal Trade Liberalization," Working papers 9602, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    6. Brainard, S. Lael & Martimort, David, 1997. "Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 33-65, February.
    7. Hong Hwang & Chao-Cheng Mai, 1991. "Optimum Discriminatory Tariffs under Oligopolistic Competition," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(3), pages 693-702, August.
    8. Katrak, Homi, 1977. "Multi-national Monopolies and Commercial Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(2), pages 283-291, July.
    9. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    10. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition," Working Papers 517, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    11. Qui, Larry D., 1994. "Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3-4), pages 333-354, May.
    12. Collie, David & Hviid, Morten, 1994. "Tariffs for a foreign monopolist under incomplete information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 249-264, November.
    13. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
    14. Collie, David & Hviid, Morten, 1993. " Export Subsidies as Signals of Competitiveness," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(3), pages 327-339.
    15. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Santiago J. Rubio & María Dolores Alepuz, 2005. "Foreign Monopolies And Tariff Agreements Under Integrated Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-38, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    2. Aditya Bhattacharjea, 2002. "Infant Industry Protection Revisited," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 115-133.
    3. Bouët, Antoine & Cassagnard, Patrice, 2013. "Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 286-293.
    4. Furusawa, Taiji & Higashida, Keisaku & Ishikawa, Jota, 2003. "What information is needed for welfare-enhancing policies under international oligopoly?," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 31-46, January.
    5. Beladi, Hamid & Chakrabarti, Avik, 2008. "Foreign equity participation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 279-295, July.
    6. McCalman, Phillip, 2010. "Trade policy in a "super size me" world," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 206-218, July.

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