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Reciprocal Trade Liberalization

Author

Listed:
  • Bagwell, K.
  • Staiger, R.W.

Abstract

Why have government found reciprocal trade agreements such as GATT to be a more effective means of facilitating trade liberalization than unilateral initiatives? We provide in this paper a analytical framework for the study of reciprocal trade agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Bagwell, K. & Staiger, R.W., 1996. "Reciprocal Trade Liberalization," Working papers 9602, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  • Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:9602
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 675-708.
    2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 833-850.
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    7. Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "What does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (Not) Tell Us That We Ought to Know?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1039, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Paul R. Krugman, 1991. "The move toward free trade zones," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 7-58.
    9. Harry G. Johnson, 1953. "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 142-153.
    10. Deardorff, Alan V., 1996. "International externalities in the use of pollution policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 53-59, March.
    11. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 779-795.
    12. Flam, Harry & Helpman, Elhanan, 1987. "Industrial policy under monopolistic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 79-102.
    13. Baldwin, Richard, 1987. "Politically realistic objective functions and trade policy PROFs and tariffs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 287-290.
    14. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 779-795.
    15. Kemp, Murray C. & Wan, Henry Jr., 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 95-97.
    16. Harry G. Johnson, 1965. "An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs Unions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 256-256.
    17. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2000. "Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1036, Econometric Society.
    2. Eromenko, Igor, 2010. "Accession to the WTO. Computable General Equilibrium Analysis: the Case of Ukraine. Part I," MPRA Paper 67476, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Mattoo, Aaditya, 1998. "Financial services and the WTO: Liberalization in the developing and transition economies," WTO Staff Working Papers TISD-98-03, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    4. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2001. "Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(2), pages 519-562.
    5. Paolo Epifani & Juliette Vitaloni, 2006. ""GATT-think" with Asymmetric Countries," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, pages 427-444.
    6. Bagwell Kyle & Staiger Robert W., 2003. "Protection and the Business Cycle," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, pages 1-45.
    7. Zissimos, Ben, 2007. "The GATT and gradualism," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 410-433.
    8. Furusawa, Taiji, 1999. "The negotiation of sustainable tariffs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 321-345.
    9. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1997. "Strategic export subsidies and reciprocal trade agreements: The natural monopoly case," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, pages 491-510.
    10. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1997. "Strategic export subsidies and reciprocal trade agreements: The natural monopoly case," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, pages 491-510.
    11. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "Regionalism and Multilateral Tariff Cooperation," NBER Working Papers 5921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Kolev, Dobrin R. & Prusa, Thomas J., 1999. "Tariff policy for a monopolist in a signaling game," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 51-76.
    13. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 2001. "Reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 281-325, June.
    14. Eromenko, Igor, 2011. "Accession to the WTO. Computable General Equilibrium Analysis: the Case of Ukraine," MPRA Paper 67535, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1998. "The Simple Economics of Labor Standards and the GATT," NBER Working Papers 6604, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Wilfred J. Ethier, 1998. "Regionalism in a Multilateral World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 1214-1245.
    17. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 215-248.
    18. Dobrin R. Kolev & Thomas J. Prusa, 1997. "Tariff Policy for a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers 6090, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1997. "Multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 91-123.
    20. Maggi, Giovanni & Rodriguez-Clare, Andres, 2000. "Import penetration and the politics of trade protection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 287-304.
    21. Mattoo, Aaditya, 1999. "Financial services and the World Trade Organization - liberalization commitments of the developing and transition economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2184, The World Bank.
    22. Low, Patrick & Mattoo, Aaditya, 1998. "Reform in basic telecommunications and the WTO negotiations: The Asian experience," WTO Staff Working Papers ERAD-98-01, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    23. Andrew T. Ching, 2010. "A Dynamic Oligopoly Structural Model For The Prescription Drug Market After Patent Expiration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1175-1207, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    INTERNATIONAL TRADE; TRADE AGREEMENTS;

    JEL classification:

    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade

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