Strategic Export Subsidies and Reciprocal Trade Agreements: The Natural Monopoly Case
why do governments seek restrictions on the use of export subsidies through reciprocal trade agreements such as GATT? With existing arguments, it is possible to understand GATT's restrictions on export subsidies as representing an inefficient victory of the interests of exporting governments over the interests of importing governments. However, to our knowledge, there does not exist a formal theoretical treatment that provides circumstances under which GATT's restrictions on export subsidies can be given a world-wide efficiency rational. In this paper, we offer one such treatment in the context of a natural monopoly market
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:att:wimass:9602 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1996.
"Reciprocal Trade Liberalization,"
NBER Working Papers
5488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1992.
"The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in Battles for Monopoly,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(4), pages 795-816, November.
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1990. "The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in Battles for Monopoly," NBER Working Papers 3235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1989. "The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in Battles for Monopoly," Discussion Papers 868, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bagwell, Kyle & Ramey, Garey, 1994. "Coordination Economies, Advertising, and Search Behavior in Retail Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 498-517, June.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983.
"International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy,"
NBER Working Papers
1192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Spencer, Barbara J & Brander, James A, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 707-22, October.
- Dixit, Avinash K & Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "The Use of Protection and Subsidies for Entry Promotion and Deterrence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 139-52, March.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984.
"Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,"
NBER Working Papers
1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
- Maggi, Giovanni, 1996. "Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Mode of Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 237-58, March.
- Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986.
"Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May.
- Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1983. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," NBER Working Papers 1236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Varian, Hal R, 1980. "A Model of Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 651-59, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:att:wimass:9605. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ailsenne Sumwalt)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.