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Export Subsidy Competition And The Wto Agreement


  • Yu-Ter Wang

    () (Department of International Business, Kai Nan University)


This paper explains the occurrence of export subsidy competition and a series of accusations by the exporters that follows it, and also examines the welfare implications of the WTO agreement that prohibits export subsidies for the countries concerned and the world as a whole. It is shown that the welfare of the exporter with low costs of production is higher when export subsidization is permitted than when it is prohibited. Furthermore, the world as a whole is better off when exporting countries subsidize their exports.

Suggested Citation

  • Yu-Ter Wang, 2003. "Export Subsidy Competition And The Wto Agreement," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 23-34, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:jed:journl:v:28:y:2003:i:1:p:23-34

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    2. David Collie, 1994. "Endogenous timing in trade policy games: Should governments use countervailing duties?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 130(1), pages 191-209, March.
    3. Janeba, Eckhard, 1998. "Tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 135-153, February.
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    More about this item


    Export Subsidy Competition; WTO;

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law


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