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Delegation and Strategic Trade Policy

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  • David Collie

Abstract

In a trade policy game where the domestic government uses a tariff and the foreign government uses an export subsidy, it is shown that the domestic government should delegate to a policy-maker who attaches less weight to the profits of the domestic firm than the welfare maximizing government. This makes domestic trade policy less aggressive and increases both domestic and foreign welfare. It is even possible that the optimal policy-maker attaches a negative weight to the profits of the domestic firm [F12, F13]

Suggested Citation

  • David Collie, 1997. "Delegation and Strategic Trade Policy," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 35-46.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:11:y:1997:i:3:p:35-46
    DOI: 10.1080/10168739700000017
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1984. "Trade warfare: Tariffs and cartels," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3-4), pages 227-242, May.
    2. Collie, David, 1991. "Export subsidies and countervailing tariffs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3-4), pages 309-324, November.
    3. Gatsios, Konstantine & Karp, Larry, 1995. "Delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 319-333, February.
    4. Konstantine Gatsios & Larry Karp, 1991. "Delegation Games in Customs Unions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 391-397.
    5. Dixit, Avinash, 1984. "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 1-16, Supplemen.
    6. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    7. David Collie, 1994. "Endogenous timing in trade policy games: Should governments use countervailing duties?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 130(1), pages 191-209, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Clarke, Roger & Collie, David R., 2006. "Maximum-Revenue versus Optimum-Welfare Export Taxes," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2006/22, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    2. Vijay Mohan & Bharat Hazari, 2012. "Tax Policy When Countries Compete for Third Market Exports," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 708-728, December.
    3. Jose Mendez-Naya, 2007. "Strategic Distortion of the Objectives of Trade Policy," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 549-557.
    4. Fang Wei, 2015. "Strategic Trade Policies and Managerial Incentives under International Cross Ownership," Review of Economics & Finance, Better Advances Press, Canada, vol. 5, pages 78-91, November.
    5. Roger Clarke & David R. Collie, 2008. "Maximum‐revenue versus Optimum‐welfare Export Taxes: a Delegation Game," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 919-929, November.
    6. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Fanti, Luciano & Buccella, Domenico, 2016. "Passive unilateral cross-ownership and strategic trade policy," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 10, pages 1-22.
    8. José Méndez Naya, 2002. "Subsidios a la producción y delegación de la política comercial en una unión aduanera," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 29(2 Year 20), pages 231-246, December.

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