Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?
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More about this item
KeywordsDelegation; Procurement; Ratchet Effect;
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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