Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem
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- Paul Levine & Neil Rickman, 2003. "Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0603, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Paul Levine & Neil Rickman & Francesc Trillas, 2006. "Price Regulation and the Commitment Problem: Can Limited Capture be Beneficial?," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0106, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
- Evans, Joanne & Levine, Paul & Trillas, Francesc, 2008.
"Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-40, January.
- Joanne Evans & Paul Levine & Fransesc Trillas, 2006. "Lobbies, Delegation and the Under-investment Problem in Regulation," School of Economics Discussion Papers 2006, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
- Maiorano, F. & Stern, J., 2007. "Institutions and investment in low and middle-income countries: the case of mobile communications," Working Papers 07/06, Department of Economics, City University London.
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- Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Brito Duarte & Pereira Pedro & Vareda João, 2013.
"Investment, Dynamic Consistency and the Sectoral Regulator’s Objective,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy,
De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 563-594, August.
- Brito, Duarte & Pereira, Pedro & Vareda, João, 2011. "Investment, dynamic consistency and the sectoral regulator's obective," 8th ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Taipei 2011: Convergence in the Digital Age 52341, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
- Paul Levine & Paul Levine & Jon Stern & Francesc Trillas, 2003. "Independent Utility Regulators: Lessons from Monetary Policy," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0403, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
More about this item
Keywordscommitment; price regulation; under investment;
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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