Separation of Ownership and Control: Delegation as a Commitment Device
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More about this item
Keywordscommitment problem; control rights; control structure; moral hazard; private bene t; separation of ownership and control; soft-budget constraint; strategic delegation;
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2015-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2015-05-02 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2015-05-02 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2015-05-02 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PPM-2015-05-02 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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