Time of the Essence
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2006. "Time of the essence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 252-272, July.
References listed on IDEAS
- Saez-Marti, Maria & Sjögren, Anna, 2008.
"Deadlines and distractions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 153-176, November.
- Saez-Marti, Maria & Sjögren, Anna, 2004. "Deadlines and Distractions," Working Paper Series 618, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 01 Jul 2004.
- Maria Saez-Marti & Anna Sj�gren, 2007. "Deadlines and Distractions," IEW - Working Papers 347, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
- Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1986.
"Optimal Dynamic R&D Programs,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 581-593, Winter.
- Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1985. "Optimal Dynamic R&D Programs," NBER Working Papers 1658, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Kremer, 1993. "The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(3), pages 551-575.
- Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-1190, September.
- Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001.
"Temptation and Self-Control,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1403-1435, November.
- W. Pesendorfer & F. Gul, 1999. "Temptation and Self-Control," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f1, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Richard A. Lambert, 1983. "Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 441-452, Autumn.
- A W. Marshall & W H. Meckling, 1962. "Predictability of the Costs, Time, and Success of Development," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 461-476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sobel, Joel, 1992. "How to Count to One Thousand," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(410), pages 1-8, January.
- Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2007.
"A theory of optimal deadlines,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 493-513, February.
- Flavio Toxvaerd, 2003. "A Theory of Optimal Deadlines," Discussion Paper Series dp357, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1999.
"Incentives for Procrastinators,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 769-816.
- Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1997. "Incentives for Procrastinators," Discussion Papers 1181, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Musgrove, Philip, 1985. "Why Everything Takes 2.71828 . . . Times as Long as Expected," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 250-252, March.
- Alex Cukierman & Zalman F. Shiffer, 1976. "Contracting for Optimal Delivery Time in Long-Term Projects," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 132-149, Spring.
- Stephen E. Spear & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
- Tirole, Jean, 1986.
"Procurement and Renegotiation,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
- Jean Tirole, 1985. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Working papers 362, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Saez-Marti, Maria & Sjögren, Anna, 2008.
"Deadlines and distractions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 153-176, November.
- Saez-Marti, Maria & Sjögren, Anna, 2004. "Deadlines and Distractions," Working Paper Series 618, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 01 Jul 2004.
- Maria Saez-Marti & Anna Sj�gren, 2007. "Deadlines and Distractions," IEW - Working Papers 347, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Aristotelis Boukouras, 2015. "Separation of Ownership and Control: Delegation as a Commitment Device," Discussion Papers in Economics 15/02, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
- Ulbricht, Robert, 2016.
"Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
- Ulbricht, Robert, 2014. "Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," TSE Working Papers 14-475, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Ulbricht, Robert, 2014. "Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 462, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Chade, Hector & Kovrijnykh, Natalia, 2016. "Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 55-92.
- Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2015. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113046, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2014. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-533, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2007.
"A theory of optimal deadlines,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 493-513, February.
- Flavio Toxvaerd, 2003. "A Theory of Optimal Deadlines," Discussion Paper Series dp357, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2011.
"Tractability in Incentive Contracting,"
The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(9), pages 2865-2894.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2009. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," NBER Working Papers 15545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2010. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," Working Papers 10-13, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
- Gabaix, Xavier & Edmans, Alex, 2009. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 7578, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Xavier Gabaix & Alex Edmans, 2010. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," 2010 Meeting Papers 1120, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Malcomson James M, 2009.
"Principal and Expert Agent,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-36, May.
- James Malcomson, 2004. "Principal and Expert Agent," Economics Series Working Papers 193, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016.
"Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
- Gabaix, Xavier & Edmans, Alex, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," CEPR Discussion Papers 10566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Scholarly Articles 34651704, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2007.
"A theory of optimal deadlines,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 493-513, February.
- Flavio Toxvaerd, 2003. "A Theory of Optimal Deadlines," Discussion Paper Series dp357, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Arantxa Jarque, 2010. "Hidden effort, learning by doing, and wage dynamics," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 96(4Q), pages 339-372.
- Clausen, Andrew, 2013.
"Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals,"
SIRE Discussion Papers
2013-13, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Andrew Clausen, 2013. "Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 225, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Ohad Kadan & Philip J. Reny & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2017.
"Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal‐Agent Problems,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 769-823, May.
- Philip J. Reny & Jeroen Swinkels & Ohad Kadan, 2011. "Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems," Working Papers 2011-002, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
- Kyle Hyndman & Alberto Bisin, 2022.
"Procrastination, self-imposed deadlines and other commitment devices,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(3), pages 871-897, October.
- Bisin, Alberto & Hyndman, Kyle, 2009. "Procrastination, self-imposed deadlines and other commitment devices," MPRA Paper 16235, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kyle Hyndman & Alberto Bisin, 2009. "Procrastination, Self-Imposed Deadlines and Other Commitment Devices," Departmental Working Papers 0904, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
- Arpad Abraham & Nicola Pavoni, 2008.
"Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 781-803, October.
- Arpad Abraham & Nicola Pavoni, 2008. "Code for "Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation"," Computer Codes 06-26, Review of Economic Dynamics.
- Chade, Hector & Swinkels, Jeroen, 2020. "The moral hazard problem with high stakes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
- Jarque, Arantxa, 2010.
"Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2412-2423, November.
- Arantxa Jarque, 2005. "Repeated Moral Hazard with Effort Persistence," 2005 Meeting Papers 428, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence," Working Paper 08-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Mele, Antonio, 2014.
"Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 69-85.
- Antonio Mele, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard and Recursive Lagrangeans," 2008 Meeting Papers 482, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mele, Antonio, 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans," MPRA Paper 30310, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mele, Antonio, 2010. "Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans," MPRA Paper 21741, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yılmaz, Murat, 2015. "Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: To exploit or not to exploit?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 46-51.
- Abraham Arpad & Nicola Pavoni, 2004.
"Efficient Allocations, with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000138, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Abraham, Arpad & Pavoni, Nicola, 2004. "Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending," Working Papers 04-05, Duke University, Department of Economics.
- Yılmaz, Murat, 2013. "Repeated moral hazard with a time-inconsistent agent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 70-89.
- Fredrik Andersson, 1994. "On the screening power of incentive schemes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 251-274, December.
- Noah Williams, 2004. "On Dynamic Principal-Agent Problems in Continuous Time," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000426, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alexander Karaivanov & Robert M. Townsend, 2014.
"Dynamic Financial Constraints: Distinguishing Mechanism Design From Exogenously Incomplete Regimes,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 887-959, May.
- Alexander Karaivanov & Robert M. Townsend, 2013. "Dynamic Financial Constraints: Distinguishing Mechanism Design from Exogenously Incomplete Regimes," NBER Working Papers 19617, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Korok Ray, 2007. "Performance Evaluations and Efficient Sorting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 839-882, September.
- Ethan Ligon & Pierre Dubois, 2012.
"Incentives & Nutrition for Rotten Kids: The Quantity & Quality of Food Allocated within Philippine Households,"
2012 Meeting Papers
375, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Dubois, Pierre & Ligon, Ethan, 2012. "Incentives & Nutrition For Rotten Kids: The Quantity & Quality Of Food Allocated Within Philippine Households," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt2r96467x, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
More about this item
Keywords
deadlines; delivery; dynamic moral hazard;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp358. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael Simkin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/crihuil.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.