Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
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- Jarque, Arantxa, 2010. "Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2412-2423, November.
- Arantxa Jarque, 2005. "Repeated Moral Hazard with Effort Persistence," 2005 Meeting Papers 428, Society for Economic Dynamics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2006.
"Moral Hazard and Persistence,"
2006 Meeting Papers
670, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Hugo A. Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2007. "Moral hazard and persistence," Working Paper 07-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Arantxa Jarque, 2010. "Hidden effort, learning by doing, and wage dynamics," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 96(4Q), pages 339-372.
- Prat, Julien & Jovanovic, Boyan, 2014.
"Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
- Julien Prat & Boyan Jovanovic, 2010. "Dynamic Incentive Contracts Under Parameter Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 16649, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jovanovic, Boyan & Prat, Julien, 2010. "Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 8136, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Julien Prat, 2011. "Dynamic Incentive Contracts Under Parameter Uncertainty," 2011 Meeting Papers 249, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Prat, Julien & Jovanovic, Boyan, 2010. "Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty," IZA Discussion Papers 5323, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Koeppl, Thorsten & Monnet, Cyril & Temzelides, Ted, 2008.
"A dynamic model of settlement,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 233-246, September.
- Monnet, Cyril & Koeppl, Thorsten Volker & Temzelides, Ted, 2006. "A dynamic model of settlement," Working Paper Series 604, European Central Bank.
- Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides & Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2006. "A Dynamic Model Of Settlement," Working Paper 1053, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Koehne, Sebastian & Kuhn, Moritz, 2013.
"Optimal capital taxation for time-nonseparable preferences,"
MPRA Paper
45203, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Koehne, Sebastian & Kuhn, Moritz, 2013. "Optimal capital taxation for time-nonseparable preferences," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79951, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Moritz Kuhn & Sebastian Koehne, 2013. "Optimal capital taxation for time-nonseparable preferences," 2013 Meeting Papers 322, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus M., 2018.
"Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation,"
SAFE Working Paper Series
218, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
- Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus M., 2019. "Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers 13643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2016.
"Learning-by-Employing: The Value of Commitment under Uncertainty,"
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(3), pages 581-620.
- Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2012. "Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment under uncertainty," Staff Report 475, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Forand, Jean Guillaume, 2015.
"Useless Prevention vs. Costly Remediation,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 10(2), pages 187-220, June.
- Jean Guillaume Forand, 2012. "Useless Prevention vs. Costly Remediation," Working Papers 1207, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2015.
- Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2010.
"Unobservable Persistent Productivity and Long Term Contracts,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 333-349, April.
- Jarque, Arantxa & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2009. "Unobservable Persistant Productivity and Long Term Contracts," UC3M Working papers. Economics we092717, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2009. "Code files for "Unobservable Persistent Productivity and Long Term Contracts"," Computer Codes 07-192, Review of Economic Dynamics.
- Jacek Rothert, 2015.
"Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(2), pages 355-374, February.
- Jacek Rothert, 2009. "Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Turnover," Department of Economics Working Papers 130124, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2012.
- Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp & Florian Hoffmann, 2016. "Deferred compensation and risk-taking incentives," 2016 Meeting Papers 674, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Simon Board & Moritz Meyer‐ter‐Vehn, 2013.
"Reputation for Quality,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2381-2462, November.
- Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Simon Board, 2009. "Reputation for Quality," 2009 Meeting Papers 160, Society for Economic Dynamics.
More about this item
Keywords
Microeconomics; Economics;JEL classification:
- D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2008-12-07 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2008-12-07 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HPE-2008-12-07 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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