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Incentives, wages, and promotions: theory and evidence

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  • Illoong Kwon

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  • Illoong Kwon, 2006. "Incentives, wages, and promotions: theory and evidence," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 100-120, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:37:y:2006:i:1:p:100-120
    DOI: j.1756-2171.2006.tb00006.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2006. "Moral Hazard and Persistence," 2006 Meeting Papers 670, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2010. "Unobservable Persistent Productivity and Long Term Contracts," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 333-349, April.
    3. Arantxa Jarque, 2010. "Hidden effort, learning by doing, and wage dynamics," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 339-372.
    4. Karachiwalla, Naureen & Park, Albert, 2017. "Promotion incentives in the public sector: Evidence from Chinese schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 109-128.
    5. Martinez, Leonardo, 2009. "A theory of political cycles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1166-1186, May.
    6. Jarque, Arantxa, 2010. "Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2412-2423, November.
    7. Andrew T. Foerster & Leonardo Martinez, 2006. "Are we working too hard or should we be working harder? A simple model of career concerns," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 79-91.
    8. Illoong Kwon & Eva Meyersson Milgrom & Seiwoon Hwang, 2010. "Cohort Effects in Promotions and Wages: Evidence from Sweden and the United States," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 45(3).
    9. Gautam Bose & Kevin Lang, 2011. "A Theory of Monitoring and Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 17623, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Moritz Kuhn & Sebastian Koehne, 2013. "Optimal capital taxation for time-nonseparable preferences," 2013 Meeting Papers 322, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Kwon, Illoong & Meyersson Milgrom, Eva M., 2014. "The significance of firm and occupation specific human capital for hiring and promotions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 162-173.
    12. Delfgaauw, Josse & Dur, Robert, 2010. "Managerial talent, motivation, and self-selection into public management," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 654-660, October.
    13. Catherine Haeck & Frank Verboven, 2012. "The Internal Economics of a University: Evidence from Personnel Data," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(3), pages 591-626.
    14. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
    15. Bas Klaauw & António Dias da Silva, 2011. "Wage dynamics and promotions inside and between firms," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 24(4), pages 1513-1548, October.
    16. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 59-108, January.
    17. Bond, Timothy N., 2011. "Internal Labor Markets in Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 64496, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 May 2015.
    18. Martinez Leonardo, 2009. "Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, May.
    19. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Jed Friedman, 2004. "Firm Ownership and Internal Labor Practices in a Transition Economy: An Exploration of Worker Skill Acquisition in Vietnam," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-696, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    21. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2012. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 1029-1059, December.

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