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Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Turnover

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  • Jacek Rothert

    () (Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract

I study the effects of monitoring on turnover of executives, when the executives' early actions have permanent effects on future outcomes. I consider an infinite-horizon environment where the expectation about the potential successor's effort is endogenous. As a result, the incentive to replace the incumbent is endogenous. In a stationary Markov equilibrium the relationship between monitoring and turnover is hump-shaped. The model sheds light on dynamic agency problems when agent's initial effort has persistent effects, and on the role of reputation in models with endogenous turnover.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacek Rothert, 2009. "Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Turnover," Department of Economics Working Papers 130124, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2012.
  • Handle: RePEc:tex:wpaper:130124
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    File URL: https://sites.google.com/site/jacekrothert/research/rothert-monitoring.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 239-256, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    learning; reputation; political instability; CEO turnover; principal-agent;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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