Principal agent problems under loss aversion: an application to executive stock options
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- David De Meza & David C Webb, 2004. "Principal Agent Problems Under Loss Aversion: An Application to Executive Stock Options," FMG Discussion Papers dp478, Financial Markets Group.
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JEL classification:
- F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
- F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
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