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Effect of personal taxes on managers' decisions to sell their stock

  • Jin, Li
  • Kothari, S.P.
Registered author(s):

    We examine the effect of personal taxes on CEOs' decisions to sell their equity, controlling for diversification, managerial overconfidence, and other determinants. While CEOs frequently sell large amounts of their unrestricted firm equity, the tax burden associated with the sale significantly deters them from selling equity even after controlling for other determinants like diversification. We also find that both taxable institutional investors and CEOs respond to taxes in their selling of equity, although CEOs appear to be less tax-sensitive. Our findings underscore the importance of taxes in corporate and managerial decisions and they have implications for executive compensation policies.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Accounting and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 46 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 1 (September)
    Pages: 23-46

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:46:y:2008:i:1:p:23-46
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae

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