Taxes, High-Income Executives, and the Perils of Revenue Estimation in the New Economy
This paper attempts to help explain the unforecasted, excess' personal income tax revenues of the last several years. Using panel data on executive compensation in the 1990s, it argues that because the gains on most stock options are treated as ordinary income for tax purposes, rising stock market valuations are directly tied to non-capital gains income. This blurred line between capital and wage income for has affected tax revenue in three ways, at least for these high-income people. First, stock performance has directly affected the amount of ordinary income that people report by influencing their stock option exercise decisions. Second, the presence of options gives executives more flexibility in changing the timing of their reported income and appears to make them much more sensitive to the short-run timing of tax changes, even accounting for the stock market changes of the period. Third, because of the tax rules on options, changing the capital gains tax rate, as the U.S. did in the late 1990s, can lead individuals to exercise their options early to convert the expected future gains into lower-taxed forms. The data show significant evidence of each of these effects and in all three cases, executives working in the new' economy and high-technology sectors
|Date of creation:||Mar 2000|
|Publication status:||published as Goolsbee, Austan. "Taxes, High-Income Executives, And The Perils Of Revenue Estimation In The New Economy," American Economic Review, 2000, v90(2,May), 271-275.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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- Austan Goolsbee, 1999. "Evidence on the High-Income Laffer Curve from Six Decades of Tax Reform," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 30(2), pages 1-64.
- John R. Graham & Michael L. Lemmon, 1998. "Measuring Corporate Tax Rates And Tax Incentives: A New Approach," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 11(1), pages 54-65.
- Jerry Hausman, 1998.
"Taxation by Telecommunications Regulation,"
in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 12, pages 29-48
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jerry Hausman, 1997. "Taxation by Telecommunications Regulation," NBER Working Papers 6260, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2000. "The Taxation of Executive Compensation," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 14, pages 1-44 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2000. "The Taxation of Executive Compensation," NBER Working Papers 7596, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Burman, Leonard E & Randolph, William C, 1994. "Measuring Permanent Responses to Capital-Gains Tax Changes in Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 794-809, September.
- Jerry Hausman, 1998. "Taxation by Telecommunications Regulation," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 53052, Winter. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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