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Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts

  • Perry, Tod
  • Zenner, Marc
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-405X(01)00083-6
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

    Volume (Year): 62 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 3 (December)
    Pages: 453-488

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:62:y:2001:i:3:p:453-488
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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    1. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    2. Yermack, David, 1995. "Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2-3), pages 237-269.
    3. Wahal, Sunil, 1996. "Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(01), pages 1-23, March.
    4. Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 163-184, June.
    5. John R. Graham & Michael L. Lemmon, 1998. "Measuring Corporate Tax Rates And Tax Incentives: A New Approach," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 11(1), pages 54-65.
    6. Lewellen, Wilbur G. & Park, Taewoo & Ro, Byung T., 1996. "Self-serving behavior in managers' discretionary information disclosure decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 227-251, April.
    7. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2000. "The Taxation of Executive Compensation," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 14, pages 1-44 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose & Catherin D. Wolfram, 1994. "Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry," NBER Working Papers 4980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Hite, Gailen L. & Long, Michael S., 1982. "Taxes and executive stock options," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 3-14, July.
    10. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
    11. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April.
    12. Graham, John R., 1996. "Proxies for the corporate marginal tax rate," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 187-221, October.
    13. Austan Goolsbee, 1997. "What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation," NBER Working Papers 6333, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Lewellen, Wilbur & Loderer, Claudio & Martin, Kenneth, 1987. "Executive compensation and executive incentive problems : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 287-310, December.
    15. Smith, C.W. & Watts, R.L., 1992. "The Investment Oppotunity set and Corporate Financing, Dividend and Compensation Policies," Papers 92-02, Rochester, Business - Financial Research and Policy Studies.
    16. Sloan, Richard G., 1993. "Accounting earnings and top executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 55-100, April.
    17. Brian J. Hall, 1999. "The Design Of Multi-Year Stock Option Plans," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 12(2), pages 97-106.
    18. Coughlan, Anne T. & Schmidt, Ronald M., 1985. "Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 43-66, April.
    19. Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F. & Sloan, Richard G., 1995. "Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 29-74, February.
    20. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691.
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