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Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Thomas Bauer & Thomas Kourouxous, 2017. "Capital Charge Rates, Investment Incentives and Taxation," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(3), pages 419-440, July.
  2. Voßmerbäumer, Jan, 2012. "Effizienzwirkungen einer Regulierung von Managergehältern durch das Steuerrecht," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 125, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
  3. Bereskin, Frederick L. & Cicero, David C., 2013. "CEO compensation contagion: Evidence from an exogenous shock," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 477-493.
  4. Lee, Janet, 2009. "Executive performance-based remuneration, performance change and board structures," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 138-162, June.
  5. Chongwoo Choe & Gloria Tian & Xiangkang Yin, 2008. "Managerial Power, Stock-Based Compensation, And Firm Performance: Theory And Evidence," Monash Economics Working Papers 21/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  6. Li, Si & Perez, M. Fabricio, 2021. "The evolution of pay premiums for managerial attributes," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  7. Jan Voßmerbäumer, 2012. "Effizienzwirkungen einer Regulierung von Managergehältern durch das Steuerrecht," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 64(5), pages 536-561, August.
  8. Katsuyuki Kubo & Takuji Saito, 2008. "The Relationship Between Financial Incentives For Company Presidents And Firm Performance In Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 401-418, December.
  9. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer.
  10. Blacconiere, Walter G. & Johnson, Marilyn F. & Lewis, Melissa F., 2008. "The role of tax regulation and compensation contracts in the decision to voluntarily expense employee stock options," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 101-111, September.
  11. Dechow, Patricia M. & Myers, Linda A. & Shakespeare, Catherine, 2010. "Fair value accounting and gains from asset securitizations: A convenient earnings management tool with compensation side-benefits," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1-2), pages 2-25, February.
  12. Frydman, Carola & Molloy, Raven S., 2011. "Does tax policy affect executive compensation? Evidence from postwar tax reforms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1425-1437.
  13. Heron, Randall A. & Lie, Erik, 2007. "Does backdating explain the stock price pattern around executive stock option grants?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 271-295, February.
  14. Desai, Mihir A. & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2006. "Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 145-179, January.
  15. Muurling, Rutger & Lehnert, Thorsten, 2004. "Option-based compensation: a survey," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 365-401.
  16. Bryan, Stephen & Nash, Robert & Patel, Ajay, 2006. "Can the agency costs of debt and equity explain the changes in executive compensation during the 1990s?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 516-535, June.
  17. Feng-Li Lin, 2016. "Executive Pay and Market Value Sensitivity," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 63(4), pages 411-424, September.
  18. Nohel, Tom & Todd, Steven, 2005. "Compensation for managers with career concerns: the role of stock options in optimal contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 229-251, March.
  19. Harashima, Taiji, 2019. "Why Is Executive Compensation So High? A Model of Executive Compensation," MPRA Paper 91326, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "CEO compensation : trends, market changes, and regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 94(Sum), pages 265-300.
  21. Balsam, Steven & Miharjo, Setiyono, 2007. "The effect of equity compensation on voluntary executive turnover," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 95-119, March.
  22. Ron Shalev & Ivy Xiying Zhang & Yong Zhang, 2013. "CEO Compensation and Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Purchase Price Allocation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(4), pages 819-854, September.
  23. Brian Cadman & Linda Vincent, 2015. "The Role of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in Executive Compensation," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 779-800, December.
  24. Comprix, Joseph & Muller III, Karl A., 2006. "Asymmetric treatment of reported pension expense and income amounts in CEO cash compensation calculations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 385-416, December.
  25. Darius Palia & S. Ravid & Chia-Jane Wang, 2008. "Founders versus non-founders in large companies: financial incentives and the call for regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 55-86, February.
  26. Yan-Leung Cheung & Aris Stouraitis & Anita Wong, 2003. "Ownership Concentation and Executive COmpenation in Closely Held Firms: Evidence from Hong Kong," Working Papers 142003, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  27. Choe, Chongwoo & Tian, Gloria Y. & Yin, Xiangkang, 2014. "CEO power and the structure of CEO pay," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 237-248.
  28. Taye Mengistae & Lixin Colin Xu, 2004. "Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 615-638, July.
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