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Executive performance-based remuneration, performance change and board structures

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  • Lee, Janet

Abstract

This paper examines CEO performance-based remuneration in companies that experience improvement in financial performance but have different board structures. It analyzes how such payment relates to change in financial performance and board structures by comparing the cases between Australian and Singaporean companies. The results highlight that performance pay in both countries is likely to be linked to change in performance. However, the proportion of CEO performance-based payment in both countries does not seem to be related to board structure. Larger firms in both countries appear to make great use of performance-based remuneration. Sales revenue is likely to be used by companies in both countries as a yardstick for determining CEO performance pay.

Suggested Citation

  • Lee, Janet, 2009. "Executive performance-based remuneration, performance change and board structures," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 138-162, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:accoun:v:44:y:2009:i:2:p:138-162
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    Cited by:

    1. Bliss, Mark A. & Gul, Ferdinand A., 2012. "Political connection and cost of debt: Some Malaysian evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1520-1527.
    2. repec:eee:ecmode:v:64:y:2017:i:c:p:211-220 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:bla:abacus:v:52:y:2016:i:4:p:619-684 is not listed on IDEAS

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