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Effectiveness of CEO pay-for-performance

Author

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  • Mishra, Chandra S.
  • McConaughy, Daniel L.
  • Gobeli, David H.

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Suggested Citation

  • Mishra, Chandra S. & McConaughy, Daniel L. & Gobeli, David H., 2000. "Effectiveness of CEO pay-for-performance," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 1-13.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:revfin:v:9:y:2000:i:1:p:1-13
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gilson, Stuart C., 1990. "Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders : Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 355-387, October.
    2. Bizjak, John M. & Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L., 1993. "Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 349-372, April.
    3. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
    4. Gilson, Stuart C., 1989. "Management turnover and financial distress," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 241-262, December.
    5. Daniel L. McConaughy & Chandra S. Mishra, 1996. "Debt, Performance-Based Incentives, and Firm Performance," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 25(2), Summer.
    6. Robert L. Lippert & William T. Moore, 1995. "Monitoring Versus Bonding: Shareholder Rights and Management Compensation," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 24(3), Fall.
    7. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    8. Barkema, Harry & Geroski, Paul & Schwalbach, Joachim, 1997. "Managerial compensation, strategy and firm performance: an introduction," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 413-416, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lee, Janet, 2009. "Executive performance-based remuneration, performance change and board structures," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 138-162, June.
    2. Jared Harris, 2009. "What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 85(1), pages 147-156, February.
    3. Joaquim Vergés, 2010. "Incentive schemes for executive officers when forecasts matter," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(5), pages 339-352.

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