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Determinants of management compensation with risk-averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm

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  • Kraft, Kornelius
  • Niederprum, Antonia

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  • Kraft, Kornelius & Niederprum, Antonia, 1999. "Determinants of management compensation with risk-averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 17-27, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:40:y:1999:i:1:p:17-27
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moerland, Pieter W., 1995. "Alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different corporate systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-34, January.
    2. Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 142-159, April.
    3. Cosh, Andy & Hughes, Alan, 1997. "Executive remuneration, executive dismissal and institutional shareholdings," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 469-492, July.
    4. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 30, April.
    5. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    6. Thonet, P J & Poensgen, O H, 1979. "Managerial Control and Economic Performance in Western Germany," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 23-37, September.
    7. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The regulation of multiproduct firms : Part I: Theory," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-36, October.
    8. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    10. Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 510-546, June.
    11. Andrews, Donald W K, 1991. "Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 817-858, May.
    12. Leech, Dennis & Leahy, John, 1991. "Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications and the Performance of Large British Companies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1418-1437, November.
    13. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    14. Garen, John E, 1994. "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1175-1199, December.
    15. Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 163-184, June.
    16. Horn, Henrik & Lang, Harald & Lundgren, Stefan, 1994. "Competition, long run contracts and internal inefficiencies in firms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 213-233, February.
    17. Palley, Thomas I., 1997. "Managerial turnover and the theory of short-termism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 547-557, April.
    18. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    19. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-1156.
    20. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
    21. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    22. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    23. Gilson, Stuart C., 1989. "Management turnover and financial distress," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 241-262, December.
    24. Rebitzer, James B., 1995. "Is there a trade-off between supervision and wages? An empirical test of efficiency wage theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 107-129, September.
    25. Ahn, Seung C. & Schmidt, Peter, 1995. "Efficient estimation of models for dynamic panel data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 5-27, July.
    26. Perri, Timothy J., 1994. "Influence activity and executive compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 169-181, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2009. "Capital control, debt financing and innovative activity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 372-383, August.
    2. Bayer, Christian & Burhop, Carsten, 2009. "Corporate governance and incentive contracts: Historical evidence from a legal reform," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 464-481, October.
    3. repec:lan:wpaper:3594 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    5. Dietl, Helmut M. & Grossmann, Martin & Lang, Markus & Wey, Simon, 2013. "Incentive effects of bonus taxes in a principal-agent model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 93-104.
    6. Roberto Barontini & Stefano Bozzi, 2011. "Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(1), pages 59-89, February.
    7. Dirk Czarnitzki & Kornelius Kraft, 2004. "Management Control and Innovative Activity," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 24(1), pages 1-24, February.
    8. repec:kap:jmgtgv:v:21:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10997-016-9359-z is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2014. "Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 607-627.
    10. Christian Bayer & Carsten Burhop, 2008. "A Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 60(4), pages 378-399, October.
    11. Lee, Janet, 2009. "Executive performance-based remuneration, performance change and board structures," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 138-162, June.
    12. Dirk Czarnitzki & Kornelius Kraft, 2004. "Firm Leadership and Innovative Performance: Evidence from Seven EU Countries," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 22(5), pages 325-332, June.
    13. Czarnitzki Dirk & Kraft Kornelius, 2003. "Unternehmensleitung und Innovationserfolg / Corporate Management and Innovation," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 223(6), pages 641-658, December.
    14. Marc Goergen & Miguel Manjon & Luc Renneboog, 2008. "Is the German system of corporate governance converging towards the Anglo-American model?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 12(1), pages 37-71, March.
    15. Jin, Li, 2002. "CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 29-63, October.
    16. Ivan Stoykov & Paraskeva Dimitrova, 2003. "Modelling Firm Activity," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 3, pages 3-24.
    17. Bernd Frick & Robert Simmons, 2008. "The impact of managerial quality on organizational performance: evidence from German soccer," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(7), pages 593-600.
    18. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2001. "Unternehmensleitung und Innovationserfolg," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-70, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    19. Kyriacos Kyriacou & Bryan Mase, 2006. "The Adverse Consequences of Share-Based Pay in Risky Companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(3), pages 307-323, September.
    20. Frick, Bernd & Simmons, Robert, 2006. "Impact of Managerial Quality on Organizational Performance. Evidence from German Soccer," Efficiency Series Papers 2006/05, University of Oviedo, Department of Economics, Oviedo Efficiency Group (OEG).
    21. repec:lan:wpaper:3702 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. repec:lan:wpaper:3596 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Engesaeth, E.J.P., 2011. "Managerial compensation contracting," Other publications TiSEM 5eb8d152-e701-4e5c-8852-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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