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Firm Leadership and Innovative Performance: Evidence from Seven EU Countries

  • Dirk Czarnitzki


  • Kornelius Kraft


This paper considers the effect of different firm leadership on the innovative performance of firms from seven EU countries. We investigate whether owner-led or manager-led firms achieve a larger share of their turnover with product innovations. Economic theory does not propose clear answers to this question. In the empirical analysis, it turns out that the manager-led firms are more active innovators: the share of sales based on new products is larger if firms' managers do not hold any of the firms' capital. Surprisingly, there are no differences between the seven countries included in the regression analysis.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Small Business Economics.

Volume (Year): 22 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 (06)
Pages: 325-332

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Handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:22:y:2004:i:5:p:325-332
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  1. Gourieroux,Christian, 2000. "Econometrics of Qualitative Dependent Variables," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521589857.
  2. Gilson, Stuart C., 1989. "Management turnover and financial distress," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 241-262, December.
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  6. Gourieroux,Christian, 2000. "Econometrics of Qualitative Dependent Variables," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521331494.
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  8. Gourieroux, Christian & Monfort, Alain & Trognon, Alain, 1984. "Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods: Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(3), pages 681-700, May.
  9. Leslie E. Papke & Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 1993. "Econometric Methods for Fractional Response Variables with an Application to 401(k) Plan Participation Rates," NBER Technical Working Papers 0147, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
  11. Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 510-46, June.
  12. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  13. Kraft, Kornelius & Niederprum, Antonia, 1999. "Determinants of management compensation with risk-averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 17-27, September.
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