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Unternehmensleitung und Innovationserfolg

  • Dirk Czarnitzki


    (ZEW Mannheim)

  • Kornelius Kraft


    (Universität Dortmund)

In dieser Arbeit werden die verschiedenen Anreize für Manager zur Durchführung von Innovationsprojekten im Vergleich zu denjenigen von Unternehmenseignern untersucht. Für einen Manager bestehen gegenläufige Anreize Innovationen intensiver oder weniger intensiv zu verfolgen als Eigner. Einerseits spricht das mit diesen Projekten verbundene Risiko gegen Innovationsaktivitäten, andererseits wirkt das bei einem erfolgreichen Abschluss erzielte Wachstumspotential als ein positiver Anreiz. Unsere Untersuchung über die Determinanten des Innovationserfolges liefert empirische Ergebnisse zu dieser Frage. Es wird ein Sample von 2018 Beobachtungen verwendet und es zeigt sich, dass eigentümergeführte Unternehmen geringere Umsätze mit Marktneuheiten erzielen als managementgeleitete. Unsere Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass die Leitung von Unternehmen wichtige Konsequenzen für Produktinnovationen hat.

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Article provided by Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics in its journal Journal of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): 223 (2003)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 641-659

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Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:223:y:2003:i:6:p:641-659
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