Corporate governance, competition policy and industrial policy
This paper shows that introducing agency considerations into a model of innovations and growth can have radical consequences as to the effects of competition policy and industrial policy on the rate of technological change. Whilst competition policy (resp. industrial policy) has a negative (resp. a positive) effect on growth in a Schumpeterian model with profit-maximising firms, these effects are shown to be both reversed when agency problems within innovating firms become sufficiently important. © 1997 Elsevier Science B.V.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in: European Economic Review (1997) v.41 n° 3-5,p.797-805|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: CP135, 50, avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 1050 Bruxelles|
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"Dynamic count data models of technological innovation,"
IFS Working Papers
W94/10, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Blundell, Richard & Griffith, Rachel & Van Reenen, John, 1995. "Dynamic Count Data Models of Technological Innovation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(429), pages 333-44, March.
- Nickell, Stephen J, 1996.
"Competition and Corporate Performance,"
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- Mayer, Colin, 1987.
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"What Makes Firms Perform Well?,"
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dp0308, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
- Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1996. "Research and Development in the Growth Process," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 49-73, March.
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