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Management Control and Innovative Activity

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  • Dirk Czarnitzki

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  • Kornelius Kraft

Abstract

This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R & D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R & D intensity presentsempirical results concerning this question. A sample of German firms with 4,126 observations is used to estimate Tobit and semiparametric censored least absolute deviation (CLAD) models. It turns out that the owner-led firms invest less into R & D than the managerial firms. With respect to the manager-led firms, we have mixed results concerning the question whether expenditures on R & D depend on the control exerted.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Czarnitzki & Kornelius Kraft, 2004. "Management Control and Innovative Activity," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 24(1), pages 1-24, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:24:y:2004:i:1:p:1-24
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Czarnitzki & Kornelius Kraft, 2010. "On the profitability of innovative assets," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(15), pages 1941-1953.
    2. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2009. "Capital control, debt financing and innovative activity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 372-383, August.
    3. Giovanni Cerulli & Bianca Poti', 2016. "Explaining firm sensitivity to R&D subsidies within a dose-response model: The role of financial constraints, real cost of investment, and strategic value of R&D," DEM Working Papers 2016/09, Department of Economics and Management.
    4. Hanna Hottenrott & Bettina Peters, 2012. "Innovative Capability and Financing Constraints for Innovation: More Money, More Innovation?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 1126-1142, November.
    5. Rammer, Christian & Schubert, Torben & Hünermund, Paul & Köhler, Mila & Iferd, Younes & Peters, Bettina, 2016. "Dokumentation zur Innovationserhebung 2015," ZEW Dokumentationen 16-01, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Michael Berlemann & Vera Jahn, 2016. "Regional Importance of Mittelstand Firms and Innovation Performance," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(11), pages 1819-1833, November.
    7. Dirk Czarnitzki & Hanna Hottenrott, 2011. "R&D investment and financing constraints of small and medium-sized firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 65-83, January.
    8. Ghosh, Saibal, 2016. "Banker on board and innovative activity," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(10), pages 4205-4214.
    9. repec:kap:iecepo:v:14:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10368-016-0371-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. H. T. Tran & E. Santarelli, 2013. "Revisiting Italian Emigration Before the Great War: A Test of the Standard Economic Model," Working Papers wp909, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    11. Caggese, Andrea, 2012. "Entrepreneurial risk, investment, and innovation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 287-307.
    12. repec:kap:jtecht:v:42:y:2017:i:5:d:10.1007_s10961-016-9475-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Väänänen, Lotta, 2003. "Agency Costs and R&D: Evidence from Finnish SMEs," Discussion Papers 859, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    14. Ghosh, Saibal, 2006. "R&D in Indian public enterprises: An assessment," MPRA Paper 32073, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Berlemann, Michael & Jahn, Vera, 2014. "Governance, Firm Size and Innovative Capacity: Regional Empirical Evidence for Germany," Working Paper 150/2014, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    16. Ortega-Argilés , Raquel & Moreno, Rosina, 2009. "Evidence on the role of ownership structure on firms’ innovative performance," INVESTIGACIONES REGIONALES - Journal of REGIONAL RESEARCH, Asociación Española de Ciencia Regional, issue 15, pages 231-250.
    17. Jirjahn, Uwe & Kraft, Kornelius, 2006. "Do Spillovers Stimulate Incremental or Drastic Product Innovations? Hypotheses and Evidence from German Establishment Data," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-023, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    18. Sellami Basma, 2008. "Gouvernement D'Entreprise Et Investissement En R&D : Une Etude Sur Le Sbf 250," Post-Print halshs-00525983, HAL.
    19. Wouter Broekaert & Petra Andries & Koenraad Debackere, 2016. "Innovation processes in family firms: the relevance of organizational flexibility," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 771-785, October.
    20. Munari, Federico & Oriani, Raffaele & Sobrero, Maurizio, 2010. "The effects of owner identity and external governance systems on R&D investments: A study of Western European firms," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 1093-1104, October.
    21. Volker Zimmermann, 2003. "Innovationsaktivitäten von kmU im verarbeitenden Gewerbe: Was zeichnet Imitatoren und originäre Innovatoren aus?," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-37, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    22. Bastiaan M. Overvest & Jasper Veldman, 2008. "Managerial incentives for process innovation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(7), pages 539-545.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C24 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models; Threshold Regression Models
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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