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The regulation of multiproduct firms : Part I: Theory

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  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques
  • Tirole, Jean

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  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The regulation of multiproduct firms : Part I: Theory," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-36, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:43:y:1990:i:1:p:1-36
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    Cited by:

    1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 258-293, April.
    2. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2009. "Capital control, debt financing and innovative activity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 372-383, August.
    3. Aguirre, Iñaki & Beitia, Arantza, 2017. "Modelling countervailing incentives in adverse selection models: A synthesis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 82-89.
    4. Auriol, Emmanuelle, 1998. "Deregulation and quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 169-194, March.
    5. Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019. "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(1), pages 87-135, March.
    6. Martin Besfamille & Nicolás Figueroa & León Guzmán, 2023. "Ramsey pricing revisited: Natural monopoly regulation with evaders," Documentos de Trabajo 576, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    7. Ivaldi, Marc & Pouyet, Jerome, 2018. "Eliciting the regulation of an economic system: The case of the French rail industry," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 21-30.
    8. De Borger, Bruno, 1997. "Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 765-781, December.
    9. Mokhtar Kouki & Sang Park & Eric Renault, 2014. "Estimating scale economies in financial intermediation: a doubly indirect inference," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 351-365, June.
    10. Martin Besfamille & Nicolás Figueroa & León Guzmán, 2022. "Fare Evasion and Monopoly Regulation," Documentos de Trabajo 566, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    11. Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019. "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(1), pages 87-135, March.
    12. Moresi, Serge, 1998. "Optimal taxation and firm formation:: A model of asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(8), pages 1525-1551, September.
    13. T. N. Srinivasan, 2002. "Privatisation, Regulation, and Competition in South Asia," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 41(4), pages 389-422.
    14. De Borger, Bruno & Wouters, Sandra, 1998. "Transport externalities and optimal pricing and supply decisions in urban transportation: a simulation analysis for Belgium," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 163-197, March.
    15. Isabelle Brocas, 2004. "Optimal Regulation of Cooperative R&D Under Incomplete Information," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 81-120, March.
    16. David, Laurent & Le Breton, Michel & Merillon, Olivier, 2007. "Kolm as a Contributor to Public Utility Pricing, Second Best Culture and the Theory of Regulation," IDEI Working Papers 490, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    17. Aguirre Pérez, Iñaki & Beitia Ruiz de Mendarozqueta, María Aranzazu, 2014. "Countervailing incentives in adverse selection models. A synthesis," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    18. Horn, Henrik & Lang, Harald & Lundgren, Stefan, 1995. "Managerial effort incentives, X-inefficiency and international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 117-138, January.
    19. Kraft, Kornelius & Niederprum, Antonia, 1999. "Determinants of management compensation with risk-averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 17-27, September.
    20. Raineri, Ricardo & Giaconi, Pablo, 2005. "Price and access charge discrimination in electricity distribution: An application to the Chilean case," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 771-790, September.
    21. Vigren, Andreas, 2014. "Costs for Swedish public transport authorities in tendered bus contracts," Working papers in Transport Economics 2014:22, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
    22. Kotakorpi, Kaisa, 2002. "Access Pricing and Competition in Telecommunications," Discussion Papers 283, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    23. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2015. "The adverse effects of incentives regulation in health care: a comparative analysis with the U.S. and Japanese hospital data," Working Papers w0218, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    24. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2015. "The adverse effects of incentives regulation in health care: a comparative analysis with the U.S. and Japanese hospital data," Working Papers w0218, New Economic School (NES).
    25. Lee, Sang-Kyu & Kim, Jae-Cheol, 1996. "An incentive scheme of a non-linear price schedule for regulating a monopolist with unknown cost," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 271-278, February.

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