Managerial effort incentives, X-inefficiency and international trade
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Horn, H. & Lang, H. & Lundgren, S., 1991. "Managerial Effort Incentives, X-Inefficiency and International Trade," Papers 507, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
References listed on IDEAS
- repec:bla:econom:v:45:y:1978:i:179:p:273-86 is not listed on IDEAS
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987.
"Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn.
- Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E., 1991. "The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt7m13v5dd, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983.
"Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-1819, November.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- James R. MARKUSEN, 2021.
"Trade And The Gains From Trade With Imperfect Competition,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: BROADENING TRADE THEORY Incorporating Market Realities into Traditional Models, chapter 14, pages 303-323,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Markusen, James R., 1981. "Trade and the gains from trade with imperfect competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 531-551, November.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1992.
"The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 350-365, Autumn.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E., 1991. "The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt7m13v5dd, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin., 1991. "The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior," Economics Working Papers 91-182, University of California at Berkeley.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The regulation of multiproduct firms : Part I: Theory," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-36, October.
- Michael L. Katz, 1991.
"Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
- Katz, Michael L., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt79b870w0, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Michael L. Katz., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Economics Working Papers 91-172, University of California at Berkeley.
- Horn, Henrik & Lang, Harald & Lundgren, Stefan, 1994.
"Competition, long run contracts and internal inefficiencies in firms,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 213-233, February.
- Horn, H. & Lang, H. & Lundgren, S., 1991. "Competition, Long Run Contracts and Internal Inefficiencies in Firms," Papers 506, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
- David Scharfstein, 1988. "Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 147-155, Spring.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Koji Ishibashi, 2010. "Effects Of Asymmetric Information Within A Firm On Oligopolistic Market Outcomes," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 488-506, December.
- Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999.
"Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 1999-2043, December.
- Rajesh Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1996. "Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 5648, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alejandro Robinson Cortés, 2013. "Eficiencia Interna y Competencia de Mercado en Oligopolio," Undergraduate theses (Spanish) tesl001, CIDE, División de Economía.
- Esther Gal‐Or, 1997. "Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 235-256, June.
- Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2023.
"Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(5), pages 1294-1355.
- Miguel Anton & Florian Ederer & Mireia Gine & Martin Schmalz, 2016. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2046R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2017.
- Miguel Anton & Florian Ederer & Mireia Gine & Martin C. Schmalz, 2022. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," NBER Working Papers 30785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Schmalz, Martin & Ederer, Florian & Gine, Mireia & Antón, Miguel, 2018. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12674, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin C. Schmalz, 2016. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 6178, CESifo.
- Miguel Anton & Florian Ederer & Mireia Gine & Martin Schmalz, 2016. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2046, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Stefan Beiner & Markus M. Schmid & Gabrielle Wanzenried, 2011.
"Product Market Competition, Managerial Incentives and Firm Valuation,"
European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 17(2), pages 331-366, March.
- Stefan Beiner & Markus Schmid & Gabrielle Wanzenried, 2004. "Product Market Competition, Managerial Inventives, and Firm Valuation," Diskussionsschriften dp0412, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Dam, Kaniṣka & Robinson-Cortés, Alejandro, 2020. "Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: How does firm entry shape managerial incentives?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 60-77.
- Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina & Salvatore Piccolo, 2005. "Competitive Pressure, Incentives and Managerial Rewards," CSEF Working Papers 148, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jul 2006.
- Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008.
"Recent developments in German corporate governance,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper 2004-123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper 2004-014, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Other publications TiSEM db2cef31-d47e-445d-ba35-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Other publications TiSEM f1cb70de-0638-4cfc-baf6-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Alexandra Groß-Schuler & Jürgen Weigand, 2001. "Sunk Costs, Managerial Incentives and Firm Productivity," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 70(2), pages 275-287.
- Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine.
- Kirstein, Roland & Kirstein, Annette, 2004.
"Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies,"
CSLE Discussion Paper Series
2004-09, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Roland Kirstein & Annette Kirstein, 2007. "Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies," FEMM Working Papers 07004, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Koeke, J. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2002.
"Does Good Corporate Governance Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth?,"
Other publications TiSEM
fd324cf7-56f6-45a2-a61e-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Koeke, J. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2002. "Does Good Corporate Governance Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth?," Discussion Paper 2002-89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Barcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos & Casado-Izaga, F. Javier, 2005. "Should shareholders delegate location decisions?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 209-222, September.
- Ennasri, Ahmed & Willinger, Marc, 2014. "Incentives and managerial effort under competitive pressure: An experiment," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 324-337.
- Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2014.
"Contracts, Ownership, and Industrial Organization: Past and Future,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(suppl_1), pages 82-117.
- Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2014. "Contracts, Ownership, and Industrial Organization: Past and Future," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/229731, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Tournas, Yanni, 2003.
"In-house competition, organizational slack, and the business cycle,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 505-520, June.
- Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Tournas, Yanni, 2000. "In-House Competition, Organizational Slack and the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 2557, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Barros, Fatima, 1997. "Asymmetric information as a commitment in oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 207-225, February.
- Hongbin Cai & Walter Cont, 2004.
"Agency Problems and Commitment in Delegated Bargaining,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 703-729, December.
- Hongbin Cai & Walter Cont, 2000. "Agency Problems and Commitment in Delegated Bargaining," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1270, Econometric Society.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:39:y:1995:i:1:p:117-138. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.