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CEO tax burden and debt contracting

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas R. Kubick

    (University of Nebraska-Lincoln, School of Accountancy, 435T Howard L. Hawks Hall)

  • G. Brandon Lockhart

    (Clemson University, Wilbur O. and Ann Powers College of Business)

  • David C. Mauer

    (University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Belk College of Business)

Abstract

We examine how locked-in CEO equity attributable to large unrealized capital gains tax liabilities influences the cost and restrictiveness of debt contracts. We find that firms enjoy lower loan spreads and are more (less) likely to receive ratings upgrades (downgrades) when their CEO has a large tax burden. Using the capital gains tax rate decrease in the Tax Reform Act of 1997 as an exogenous shock to CEO tax burdens, we find that CEOs with large tax burdens before the tax cut experience a sharp increase in loan spreads afterward. This increase in spreads is larger when the firm has low profitability, high bankruptcy risk, and when loans are unsecured. Further, CEO tax burdens decrease the restrictiveness of nonprice loan terms, increase syndicate size, and decrease issue costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas R. Kubick & G. Brandon Lockhart & David C. Mauer, 2025. "CEO tax burden and debt contracting," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 738-775, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reaccs:v:30:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s11142-024-09829-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11142-024-09829-5
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capital gains taxes; CEO tax burden; Bank loans; Cost of debt; Locked-in equity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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