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Capital Market Equilibrium with Personal Tax

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  • Constantinides, George M

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  • Constantinides, George M, 1983. "Capital Market Equilibrium with Personal Tax," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(3), pages 611-636, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:51:y:1983:i:3:p:611-36
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rabin, Matthew & Sobel, Joel, 1996. "Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1-25.
    2. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2004. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 351-369.
    3. Rabin, Matthew, 1990. "Communication between rational agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 144-170.
    4. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1998. "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 108-122.
    5. Rabin, Matthew & Sobel, Joel, 1996. "Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1-25.
    6. Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1379-1401.
    7. Forges, Francoise, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 155-177 Elsevier.
    8. repec:dau:papers:123456789/184 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, pages 103-118.
    10. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    11. Simon, Robert Samuel, 2002. "Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 79-102.
    12. Blume, A. & Sobel, J., 1991. "Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games," Working Papers 91-27, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
    13. Mertens,Jean-François & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015. "Repeated Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107662636, November.
      • Mertens,Jean-François & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015. "Repeated Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107030206, December.
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    15. Warneryd Karl, 1993. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 532-546.
    16. Daniel R. Vincent, 1992. "Modelling Competitive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(4), pages 590-599, Winter.
    17. Myerson, Roger B., 1994. "Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 827-847 Elsevier.
    18. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 45-71.
    19. Françoise Forges, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 375-398.
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    21. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1341-1364.
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    34. Zapater, Inigo, 1997. "Credible Proposals in Communication Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 173-197.
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    37. Matthews, Steven A. & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1991. "Refining cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 247-273.
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