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Incentive Design under Loss Aversion

Author

Listed:
  • David De Meza
  • David C Webb

Abstract

Compensation schemes often reward success but do not penalize failure. Fixed salaries with stock options or bonuses have this feature. Yet the standard principal–agent model implies that pay is normally monotonically increasing in performance. This paper shows that, under loss aversion, there will be intervals over which pay is insensitive to performance, with the use of carrots but not sticks is frequently optimal, especially when risk aversion is low and reference income is endogenous. A further benefit of capping losses, for example through options, is to discourage reckless behavior by executives seeking to resurrect their fortunes. (JEL: F3, F4)

Suggested Citation

  • David De Meza & David C Webb, 2006. "Incentive Design under Loss Aversion," FMG Discussion Papers dp571, Financial Markets Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp571
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    JEL classification:

    • F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance

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