Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse & Walker, David I, 2001. "Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents," CEPR Discussion Papers 3112, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Erik Poutsma & Paul E. M. Ligthart & Roel Schouteten, 2005. "Employee Share Schemes in Europe. The Influence of US Multinationals," management revue - Socio-Economic Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 16(1), pages 99-122.
- Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, 2015.
"CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(5), pages 2155-2184, October.
- Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, 2006. "CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation," NBER Working Papers 12068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jenter, Dirk & Kanaan, Fadi, 2015. "CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64421, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Jenter, Dirk & Kanaan, Fadi, 2008. "CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation," Research Papers 1992, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, "undated".
"Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats,"
IEW - Working Papers
187, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, 2004. "Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-03, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, 2005. "Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 1379, CESifo.
- de Meza, David & Webb, David C., 2004.
"Principal agent problems under loss aversion: an application to executive stock options,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
24676, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- David De Meza & David C Webb, 2004. "Principal Agent Problems Under Loss Aversion: An Application to Executive Stock Options," FMG Discussion Papers dp478, Financial Markets Group.
- Bechmann, Ken L. & Jørgensen, Peter Løchte, 2003. "The Value and Incentives of Option-based Compensation in Danish Listed Companies," Working Papers 2003-2, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
- Stephen J. Perkins & Chris Hendry, 2005. "Ordering Top Pay: Interpreting the Signals," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(7), pages 1443-1468, November.
- David de Meza & David C. Webb, 2007.
"Incentive Design under Loss Aversion,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(1), pages 66-92, March.
- David De Meza & David C Webb, 2006. "Incentive Design under Loss Aversion," FMG Discussion Papers dp571, Financial Markets Group.
- de Meza, David & Webb, David C., 2006. "Incentive design under loss aversion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24523, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Dutta, Sunil & Reichelstein, Stefan J., 2002. "Leading Indicator Variables, Performance Measurement and Long-Term versus Short-Term Contracts," Research Papers 1756, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Choe, Chongwoo, 2003. "Leverage, volatility and executive stock options," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(5), pages 591-609, November.
- Guy Kaplanski & Haim Levy, 2012. "Executive Short-Term Incentive, Risk-Taking And Leverage-Neutral Incentive Scheme," Annals of Financial Economics (AFE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(01), pages 1-45.
- Carlos Jimenez & Jay Vega & Jennifer Yin, 2015. "Troubled Asset Relief Program’s Impact on Earnings informativeness: A Study of Compensation Contracts," Working Papers 0187acc, College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio.
- Wim Fonteyne, 2007. "Cooperative Banks in Europe—Policy Issues," IMF Working Papers 07/159, International Monetary Fund.
- Alistair Bruce & Trevor Buck & Brian G. M. Main, 2005. "Top Executive Remuneration: A View from Europe," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(7), pages 1493-1506, November.
More about this item
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-LAB-2001-12-19 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2001-12-04 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-MIC-2001-12-19 (Microeconomics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8661. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.