The Value and Incentives of Option-based Compensation in Danish Listed Companies
Over the last decade the Danish corporate environment has experienced a significant increase in the use of option-based compensation (OBC). This and many other facts are documented in the present paper which provides the first insights into the characteristics of the option and warrant contracts issued by the complete sample of Danish companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. A newly constructed database containing all publicly available information on details of Danish OBC contracts allows us to present, for example, results regarding contract values at an aggregated as well as at firm, personnel group, and individual level. The paper also contains a section which discusses and presents evidence on the incentive effects provided by the option-based compensation contracts adopted by Danish listed companies.
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, A5, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark|
Phone: +45 3815 3815
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/finance/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Carpenter, Jennifer N., 1998.
"The exercise and valuation of executive stock options,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 127-158, May.
- Jennifer Carpenter, 1997. "The Exercise and Valuation of Executive Stock Options," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 97-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987.
"Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,"
Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 2010.
"CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay, But How,"
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,
Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 64-76.
- Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Ceo Incentives - It'S Not How Much You Pay, But How," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 3(3), pages 36-49.
- Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse & Walker, David I, 2001.
"Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3112, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, 2001. "Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?," NBER Working Papers 8661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
- Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2000.
"Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options,"
NBER Working Papers
7548, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kevin J. Murphy & Brian J. Hall, 2000. "Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 209-214, May.
- Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-54, May-June.
- Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998.
"Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsfin:2003_002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lars Nondal)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.