Leverage, Volatility and Executive Stock Options
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Note: Bibliography: p. 21-22
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- Choe, Chongwoo, 2003. "Leverage, volatility and executive stock options," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(5), pages 591-609, November.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Chongwoo Choe & Xiangkang Yin, 2006.
"Should Executive Stock Options Be Abandoned?,"
Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 31(2), pages 163-179, December.
- Choe, Chongwoo & Yin, Xiangkang, 2006. "Should executive stock options be abandoned?," MPRA Paper 13760, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chen, Yenn-Ru & Lee, Bong Soo, 2010. "A dynamic analysis of executive stock options: Determinants and consequences," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 88-103, February.
- de La Bruslerie, H. & Deffains-Crapsky, C., 2008.
"Information asymmetry, contract design and process of negotiation: The stock options awarding case,"
Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 73-91, April.
- Hubert de La Bruslerie & Catherine Deffains-Crapsky, 2008. "Information asymmetry, contract design and process of negotiation: The stock option awarding case," Post-Print hal-01947223, HAL.
- Jean Canil & Bruce Rosser, 2012. "Australian evidence on CEO option grants," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 16(3-4), pages 225-260, September.
- Terence Tai Leung Chong & Yue Ding & Yong Li, 2015.
"Executive Stock Option Pricing in China Under Stochastic Volatility,"
Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(10), pages 953-960, October.
- Chong, Terence Tai Leung & Ding, Yue & Li, Yong, 2015. "Executive Stock Option Pricing in China under Stochastic Volatility," MPRA Paper 63397, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Raghavan (Raj) J. Iyengar & H. James Williams & Ernest M. Zampelli, 2005. "Sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures in all‐equity firms," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 45(4), pages 577-595, December.
- Kim, Kyonghee & Patro, Sukesh & Pereira, Raynolde, 2017. "Option incentives, leverage, and risk-taking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-18.
- Chongwoo Choe, 2006. "Optimal CEO Compensation: Some Equivalence Results," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 171-201, January.
- Cioroianu, Iulia & Corbet, Shaen & Larkin, Charles, 2021. "The differential impact of corporate blockchain-development as conditioned by sentiment and financial desperation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
- Liljeblom, Eva & Pasternack, Daniel & Rosenberg, Matts, 2011. "What determines stock option contract design?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 293-316.
- Duru, Augustine & Iyengar, Raghavan J. & Zampelli, Ernest M., 2012. "Performance choice, executive bonuses and corporate leverage," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 1286-1305.
- Jean Canil & Bruce Rosser, 2015. "Evidence on exercise pricing in CEO option grants in two countries," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 383-410, November.
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More about this item
Keywords
Leverage; volatility; executive stock options; optimal contract;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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