Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information
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- Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen D., 2000. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 248-279, April.
- S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information," Working Papers (Old Series) 9807, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen, 1997. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Working Papers 97-19, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
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Keywords
97-19;JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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