Currency and Credit in a Private Information Economy
In an environment with private information, spatial separation, and limited communication, a currency-like object and more standard named credits can be distinguished. The credit objects can be used among agents in an enduring relationship, that is, among agents with known trading histories, whereas the currency-like object must be used among relative strangers. In this environment, collectively determined Pareto-optimal rules make the level of the currency-like object and the mix of currency to named credits responsive to individual needs and to economy-wide states. Total indebtedness is determined by the number of lenders, that is, by preference or demand shocks, and the mix of currency to credits is determined by transaction patterns among the agents. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:6:p:1323-44. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.