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Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information

  • Aiyagari, S.R.
  • Williamson, S.D.

    ()

    (University of Iowa)

We consider a random matching model without monetary exchange where agents have complete access to each others' histories. Exchange is motivated by risk sharing given random unobservable incomes. The key feature of this environment is that information is mobile across locations even while goods are not.

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Paper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 97-03.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:97-03
Contact details of provider: Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/

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  1. Williamson, Stephen D, 1998. "Payments Systems with Random Matching and Private Information," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 551-69, August.
  2. Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 2002. "Enduring relationships in an economy with capital," Working Papers 02-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  3. S. Rao Aiyagari & Neil Wallace, 1991. "Existence of steady states with positive consumption in the Kiyotaki-Wright model," Working Papers 428, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  4. S. Rao Aiyagari, 1993. "Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving," Working Papers 502, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996. "Money is memory," Staff Report 218, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  6. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March.
  7. Steve Williamson & Randall Wright, 1991. "Barter and monetary exchange under private information," Staff Report 141, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  8. S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information," Working Paper 9807, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  9. Andrew Atkeson & Robert E Lucas, 2010. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2179, David K. Levine.
  10. Wang, Cheng, 1995. "Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets," Staff General Research Papers 5249, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  11. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August.
  12. Khan, A. & Ravikumar, B., 1997. "Growth and Risk-Sharing with Private Information," Working Papers 97-13, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  13. Phelan, C. & Townsend, R.M., 1990. "Computing Multiperiod, Information-Constrained Optima," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-13, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
  14. Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-86, December.
  15. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August.
  16. Spear, Stephen E & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617, October.
  17. Phelan Christopher, 1995. "Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 488-506, August.
  18. Atkeson Andrew & Lucas Jr. , Robert E., 1995. "Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 64-88, June.
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