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Money and credit in random matching models of money

  • Leo Ferraris

I review in this paper some recent literature that deals with the coexistence of inside and outside money in a matching model of money à la Kiyotaki and Wright. I examine first a class of models that introduce credit by assuming that some agents’ actions can be monitored and punished by the other agents in the economy. I then turn to a model in which agents can (costly) commit to keep their promises. I also analyse a literature that introduces banks and private money in the model, to evaluate the Hayek-Friedman debate on the private vs. public provision of money. The very last part of the paper is devoted to the issue of coexistence of money and nominal bonds with a higher rate of return.

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Paper provided by University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics in its series Working Papers with number 59.

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Length: 31
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp59
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  1. Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti & Andres Erosa & Ted Temzelides, 1999. "Private money and reserve management in a random-matching model," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 128, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Bruce A. Champ & Neil Wallace & Warren E. Weber, 1993. "Interest rates under the U.S. national banking system," Staff Report 161, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  3. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1982. "The Real-Bills Doctrine versus the Quantity Theory: A Reconsideration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1212-36, December.
  4. Williamson, S.D., 1998. "Private Money," Working Papers 98-09, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  5. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March.
  6. Kocherlakota, Narayana & Wallace, Neil, 1998. "Incomplete Record-Keeping and Optimal Payment Arrangements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 272-289, August.
  7. Bruce Champ & Scott Freeman & Warren E. Weber, 1999. "Redemption costs and interest rates under the U.S. National Banking System," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 568-595.
  8. Trejos, Alberto & Wright, Randall, 1995. "Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 118-41, February.
  9. Shouyong Shi, 1995. "Credit and Money in a Search Model with Divisible Commodities," Working Papers 917, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  10. S. Rao Aiyagari & Neil Wallace & Randall Wright, 1996. "Coexistence of money and interest-bearing securities," Working Papers 550, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  11. Cagan, Phillip & Schwartz, Anna J, 1991. "The National Bank Note Puzzle Reinterpreted," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(3), pages 293-307, August.
  12. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August.
  13. Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-86, December.
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