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Money and Credit With Limited Commitment and Theft

  • Williamson, Stephen
  • Sanches, Daniel

We study the interplay among imperfect memory, limited commitment, and theft, in an environment that can support monetary exchange and credit. Imperfect memory makes money useful, but it also permits theft to go undetected, and therefore provides lucrative opportunities for thieves. Limited commitment constrains credit arrangements, and the constraints tend to tighten with imperfect memory, as this mitigates punishment for bad behavior in the credit market. Theft matters for optimal monetary policy, but at the optimum theft will not be observed in the model. The Friedman rule is in general not optimal with theft, and the optimal money growth rate tends to rise as the cost of theft falls.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20690/2/MPRA_paper_20690.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20690.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20690
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  1. Guillaume Rocheteau & Randall Wright, 2004. "Money in search equilibrium, in competitive equilibrium, and in competitive search equilibrium," Working Paper 0405, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  2. S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1997. "Credit in a Random Matching Model With Private Information," Game Theory and Information 9705005, EconWPA.
  3. David Andolfatto, 2007. "Incentives and the Limits to Deflationary Policy," Discussion Papers dp07-14, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
  4. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "Money Is Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August.
  5. Deviatov, Alexei & Wallace, Neil, 2009. "A model in which monetary policy is about money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 283-288, April.
  6. He, Ping & Huang, Lixin & Wright, Randall, 2008. "Money, banking, and monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 1013-1024, September.
  7. James Bullard & Gaetano Antinolfi & Costas Azariadis, 2008. "The optimal inflation target in an economy with limited enforcement," Speech 167, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  8. Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen D., 2000. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 248-279, April.
  9. Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2005. "A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 463-484, June.
  10. Ireland, Peter N, 1994. "Money and Growth: An Alternative Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 47-65, March.
  11. Andrew Atkeson & Robert E Lucas, 2010. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2179, David K. Levine.
  12. Trejos, Alberto & Wright, Randall, 1995. "Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 118-41, February.
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