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Optimal allocations with incomplete record-keeping and no commitment

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Narayana R. Kocherlakota
  • Neil Wallace

Abstract

We study a random-matching, absence-of-double-coincidence environment in which people cannot precommit and in which there are two imperfect ways of keeping track of what other people have done in the past: money and a public record of all past actions that is updated with an average lag. We study how the magnitude of that lag affects the allocations that are optimal from among allocations that are stationary and feasible and that satisfy incentive constraints which arise from the absence of commitment and the imperfect ways of keeping track of what others have done in the past.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Working Papers with number 578.

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Date of creation: 1997
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:578
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Keywords: Econometric models;

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  1. Shi Shougong, 1995. "Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 467-496, December.
  2. Rao Aiyagari, S. & Wallace, Neil & Wright, Randall, 1996. "Coexistence of money and interest-bearing securities," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 397-419, June.
  3. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "Money Is Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August.
  4. Mark Huggett & Stefan Krasa, 1996. "Money and storage in a differential information economy (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 191-209.
  5. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-954, August.
  6. S. Rao Aiyagari & Neil Wallace, 1991. "Existence of Steady States with Positive Consumption in the Kiyotaki-Wright Model," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(5), pages 901-916.
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Cited by:

  1. Tai-wei Hu & John Kennan & Neil Wallace, 2009. "Coalition-Proof Trade and the Friedman Rule in the Lagos-Wright Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(1), pages 116-137, 02.
  2. Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Payment systems with random matching and private information," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Aug, pages 551-572.
  3. Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti & Neil Wallace, 1999. "A model of private bank-note issue," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(1), pages 104-136, January.
  4. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "Money Is Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August.
  5. Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen, 1997. "Money, Credit, and Allocation Under Complete Dynamic Contracts and Incomplete Markets," Working Papers 97-20, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  6. Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen D., 2000. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 248-279, April.
  7. Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti & Neil Wallace, 1997. "A model of regulated private bank-note issue," Working Papers 581, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

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