Deadlines and distractions
We consider a task, demanding a sequence of efforts, that must be completed by a deadline. Effort is not contractible. Agents face shocks to their opportunity cost of time and are sometimes distracted from work. We show that agents who are often distracted may outperform agents who are distracted less often. The reason is that anticipation of distractions induces agents to start earlier for precautionary reasons. Principals can increase the probability of completion, and achieve higher profits, by strategically setting "tight" deadlines, provided that the deadlines can be extended with some positive probability.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Flavio Toxvaerd, 2003.
"A Theory of Optimal Deadlines,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp357, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Sjögren, Anna & Saez-Marti, Maria, 2004. "On the Timing of Education," Working Paper Series 614, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Fischer, Carolyn, 2001.
"Read this paper later: procrastination with time-consistent preferences,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 249-269, November.
- Fischer, Carolyn, 1999. "Read This Paper Later: Procrastination with Time-Consistent Preferences," Discussion Papers dp-99-19, Resources For the Future.
- Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1999.
"Incentives for Procrastinators,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 769-816.
- Flavio Toxvaerd, 2004.
"Time of the Essence,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp358, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Fischer, Carolyn, 1999. "Read This Paper Even Later: Procrastination with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," Discussion Papers dp-99-20, Resources For the Future.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:143:y:2008:i:1:p:153-176. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.