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Performance of procrastinators: on the value of deadlines

  • Fabian Herweg


  • Daniel Müller


Earlier study has shown that procrastination can be explained by quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We present a model of effort choice over time that shifts the focus from completion of to performance on a single task. We find that being aware of the own self-control problems may reduce a person’s performance as well as his or her overall well-being, which is in contrast to the existing literature on procrastination. Extending this framework to a multi-task model, we show that interim deadlines help a quasi-hyperbolic discounter to structure his or her workload more efficiently, which in turn leads to better performance. Moreover, being restricted by deadlines increases a quasi-hyperbolic discounter’s well-being. Thus, we provide a theoretical underpinning for recent empirical evidence and numerous casual observations.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 70 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 329-366

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:70:y:2011:i:3:p:329-366
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